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The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of military training on earnings for young men 
in Sweden. The analysis is based on the cohort of men born in 1973. The 1973 cohort was 
conscripted during a time of rapid change in the Swedish security policy and substantial cut-
downs  of  the  armed  forces.  As  a  consequence,  a  relatively  large  part  of  the  cohort  was 
assigned a service category after the enlistment test but one third of these individuals were 
never conscripted. We argue that these organizational changes along with the set of important 
background variables that are available makes it possible to rely on selection on observables. 
A strong result is that military training has a positive effect on annual earnings at the age of 
30 for the group in the private category that subsequently do not obtain an high educational 
level.  
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The armed forces are often referred to as a good place to start off since military training and 
experience may foster or signal personal traits such as leadership ability and perseverance. 
However, the effect of military experience on labor market outcomes is ambiguous. Second 
World War veterans have been found to experience positive wage premiums compared to 
non-veterans while the wage premium for Vietnam veterans have been negative (see, e.g. 
Rosen and Taubman, 1982, and Berger and Hirsch, 1983). One explanation that has been put 
forth is that the different returns to military experience are due to war specific circumstances, 
e.g. the public opinion, or differences in the skills and experiences that are obtained during 
service. More resent research has found that differences in subsequent labor market outcomes 
to a large extent can be explained by the selection process into the armed forces. For example, 
by utilizing the fact that the U.S. recruitment in the conscription system during World War II 
was based on the date of birth, Angrist (1998) shows that veterans from World War II did not 
earn more that non-veterans.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze to what extent Swedish military training 
is rewarded on the labor market. Sweden has a conscription system meaning that all men in 
Sweden are obliged to attend a military enlistment test and in the end military training.
1 The 
study differs from many of the earlier studies as it concerns military training in peacetime and 
not military experience from war or international peacekeeping missions. Earlier literature has 
shown that the selection problem is crucial to handle in order to identify the effect of military 
training. The research strategy in this paper for identifying the training effect is built on two 
foundations.  Firstly,  in  the  post-cold  war  era  the  Swedish  defense  transformed  from  an 
invasion defense that required a large part of every cohort to be conscripted, to a relatively 
small and highly technological organization with the main aim to participate in international 
peacekeeping missions. During the re-formation of the military defense a large number of 
individuals were assigned a service category after the enlistment test but were not conscripted 
due to extensive cut-downs and regiment closures. In our sample, that is restricted to Swedish 
men  born  in  1973  having  Swedish  born  parents,  approximately  35,000  individuals  were 
                                                 
1 Since 2007 all men are not called for enlistment test. A first web-based assessment is used to select individuals 
for the enlistment test. The reason for not calling the entire cohort for the test is mainly because a small share of 
the cohort is nowadays conscripted and the costs for testing the entire cohort cannot be motivated. 2 
 
assigned a service category. However, only 24,000 were finally conscripted, meaning that we 
have a control group of 11,000 individuals.  
Secondly,  the  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  a  wide  range  of  individual 
characteristics that can be linked to individual earning statistics. Although our control group is 
not selected on individual characteristics at the time of the enlistment test, the rich data set is 
important since a selection problem may arise in the process of regiment closedowns. During 
the transformation to a more highly technological defense requiring fewer conscripts, less 
advanced units were more likely to face cut-downs at the same time as these units may have 
required conscripts with lower “skill profile”. Since we have access to the same information 
concerning  individual  characteristics  as  the  National  Service  Administration,  relying  on 
selection on observables should be enough to identify the training effect (see Heckman and 
Robb, 1985, for a discussion). The data set contains a wide range of individual characteristics, 
e.g. parental characteristics, education levels, and test scores, all of which can be linked to 
individual earnings statistics. We also control for how well the individuals performed during 
military training since we have access to the grades given after military training.  
Regression is our main approach but we also conduct matching to check the 
robustness of the regression results. In the empirical analysis we have constructed three sub-
samples with respect to the level of command, which are strongly correlated with the length 
of the training period. The private category has the shortest training period of approximately 
seven months. The squad leader category does ten months of training and the platoon leader 
category 15 months.  
The paper contributes to the literature for (at least) two reasons. First, it focuses 
solely on training and not military experience during wartime or international peacekeeping 
missions. Second, the paper takes advantage of the transformation of the armed forces in the 
post  cold  war  era.  Furthermore,  the  results  are  of  importance  for  the  present  debate 
concerning the military personnel recruitment in Sweden. The compulsive part of the Swedish 
conscription system has been strongly criticized in the post cold war era. Although it is in the 
interest  of  the  armed  forces  that  the  conscripted  men  are  motivated  for  the  task,  the 
compulsory element of the conscription system is evident since young men that refuse to be 
conscripted can still be sentenced to imprisonment. In this context, it is of interest to have 
knowledge of the impact that military service has on the individuals’ labor market outcomes.  
The main result is that military training has a positive effect on earnings for the 
private category. Furthermore, the positive effect is dependent upon the educational level; 3 
 
individuals with low education benefit the most from participating in military training.
2 When 
applying regression analysis, some evidence is also found of a positive earnings effect for the 
squad leaders that subsequently do not obtain high education. However, this effect is not 
present when matching is conducted. We do not find any evidence that military training has 
an impact on earnings for individuals drafted for the platoon leader category.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a review of 
earlier comparable literature is presented. In section 3, we discuss our research strategy and 
data, and also compare the control group with the conscripted in different dimensions. Section 
4  contains  the  empirical  model.  The  results  are  presented  in  section  5,  and  section  6 
concludes. 
 
2. Earlier literature 
 
There is an extensive literature dealing with the impact that military training and experience 
have on individuals’ earnings and employment. Most studies are based on U.S. data but they 
do not give a unanimous picture of the effect of military training and experience on labor 
market outcomes. From an economic perspective the civilian return of military service can be 
analyzed within two traditional frameworks of labor economics: the human capital hypothesis 
and the screening hypothesis. According to the former, civilian return of military service is a 
result of the transferability of skills between military service and the civilian  sector. The 
screening hypothesis, on the other hand, highlights that even if the military service does not 
improve any skills useable in the civilian sector, the service as such provides information 
about  personal  characteristics  that  will  affect  the  post  service  civilian  earning  and 
employment positively or negatively. From an empirical point of view it is of course difficult 
to separate these effects.  
A number of studies find that veterans from World War II experienced positive 
wage premiums compared to non-veterans, while Vietnam veterans were not rewarded for 
their military experience (see e.g. Rosen and Taubman, 1982, and Berger and Hirsch, 1983). 
Several possible explanations concerning this pattern have been discussed. For example, the 
different returns for veterans have been attributed to the public opinion, which may explain 
                                                 
2 A possible objection to our analysis is that it may be too early to study earnings at the age of 30, at least for 
individuals with higher education. Different results, with respect to the individuals’ education level, may be 
found if the study is repeated later on, studying earnings in later years. 4 
 
the favorable situation for World War II veterans compared to Vietnam veterans. Another 
explanation is that the skills that veterans have acquired during services can differ between 
time periods. Several studies have also found that the returns of military experience depend 
on the arm of the service (see, e.g. Goldberg and Warner, 1987). Bryant and Wilhite (1990) 
find evidence that military training has a positive effect on wages, while the length of the 
military career affects wages in the civil life negatively. 
  A  general  methodological  problem  that  is  present  in  many  studies  is  the 
selection process into the armed forces. Firstly, a conscription system implies a screening 
process where the most suitable men are chosen for a specific service. Secondly, voluntary 
enrolment implies that individuals are self-selected into the armed forces. In both cases, it is 
likely that unobserved heterogeneity leads to comparisons that may be befouled with selection 
bias.  The  antecedent  empirical  studies  typically  disregarded  the  selection  problem;  later 
studies have in line with the return-to-schooling literature tried to the handle selection bias. 
The  development  of  methods  for  handling  self-selection  has  also  contributed  with  new 
insights regarding the impact of military experience on labor market outcomes. 
As noted, several studies find positive effects of military experience in OLS 
regressions  for  Second  World  War  veterans  in  contrast  to  the  negative  effects  found  for 
Vietnam  veterans.  Angrist  and  Krueger  (2001)  present  estimates  based  on  instrumental 
variables for World War II veterans. The instruments are constructed by using the fact that 
conscription  was  determined  by  the  date  of  birth.  The  results  presented  by  Angrist  and 
Krueger indicate that World War II veterans do not earn more than non-veterans and they may 
also earn less. Angrist (1990) uses a draft lottery during the Vietnam War in order to obtain 
non-biased  estimates  of  the  effect  of  military  services.  The  results  presented  by  Angrist 
indicated  that  earnings  of  white  veterans  in  the  early  1980’s  were  15  percent  less  than 
earnings of non-veterans. For non-white veterans, no significant results were found. Angrist 
argue  that  the  negative  effect  of  military  services  can  be  explained  by  less  civilian  job 
experience. A later study by Angrist (1998) analyses employment rates and earning for U.S. 
veterans  who  served  in  the  early  1980´s. In  this  study  Angrist  applied  two  strategies  for 
dealing with selection. Firstly, he compared enlisted with those applicants who did not enlist. 
The second strategy was to use an instrumental variable method based on an error in the 
scoring  of  exams  during  screening.  Angrist  found  that  employment  rates  after  military 
services were higher for veterans. The increase in civilian earning was small for nonwhites 
and white veterans experienced a negative effect of military services on earnings.  
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3. Research strategy and data 
 
The empirical analysis in this study is based on the cohort of men born in 1973 and residing in 
Sweden on December 31, 1990. Data have been obtained from Statistics Sweden (SCB), and 
The National Service Administration (Pliktverket). The total sample contains 57,709 men, 
46,305 (80.2 percent) of these are born in Sweden with Swedish born parents, 4,095 are 
foreign-born (7.1 percent), and 7,309 are second-generation immigrants (12.7 percent). In this 
paper we have excluded the foreign born individuals and second-generation immigrants in 
order to avoid discrimination issues. 
 
3.1 The enrolment process 
The first paragraph of the Swedish Act on Liability for Total Defense Service states “The 
Total Defense is a concern for all inhabitants (of Sweden)”. This means that the personnel 
needed by the total defense are secured by a liability for every Swedish citizen aged between 
16 and 70. As stated in the act, this obligation is also valid for all individuals living in Sweden 
without  Swedish  citizenship.  Services  within  the  total  defense  can  be  military,  civil,  or 
general.  According  the  act,  all  military  and  civil  services  contain  some  basic  training, 
refresher training, readiness service and wartime service. However, only men with Swedish 
citizenship are obliged to do military training.  
According to the Swedish Act on Liability for Total Defense Service, all males 
with Swedish citizenship have to attend the enlistment test at the Swedish National Service 
Administration. Generally, the individuals are called for at the age of 18. The enlistment test 
takes two days to carry out and comprises physical tests
3, cognitive tests
4, an evaluation of 
psychological ability
5, and a test of leadership ability. The individual is ranked from 1-9 in all 
categories (1 is low ability and 9 is high ability). The testing procedure aims at estimating the 
individuals´  ability  to  fulfill  military  services  and  to  choose  the  suitable  individuals  for 
different services.  
                                                 
3 The physical tests comprise aerobic test, muscle strength, length and weight. 
4 The cognitive test is made up by four different sub-sections; instructions, synonyms, technical comprehension, 
and metal folding. The test scores are summed and transformed into the nine-point scale. 
5 The psychological ability test score is based on an interview conducted by a psychologist during the military 
enlistment test. The main purpose of the test is to identify the individual’s social skills, emotional stability, and 
ability to handle stress. 6 
 
The range of service categories within the armed forces is numerous. Services 
such as infantry soldiers in many different categories, paratroopers, engineers, cryptographers, 
interpreters, and nurses are just a few examples that highlight the wide spectrum of services. 
The military training period range from 60 to at most 615 days (see the Swedish Act on 
Liability for Total Defense Services). For the period we study, the most common services 
have training periods of 7, 10, and 15 months. The length of the period is often associated 
with the level of command for wartime service. The shortest training period of up to seven 
months is for the private
6 category, ten months of training periods are generally observed for 
squad leaders, and platoon leaders have the longest training period of 15 months. There are 
however  variation  in  training  periods,  especially  for  some  specialist  categories  such  as 
paratroopers where all enlisted have training periods of 15 months.  
 
3.2 Data and control groups 
Due to the change in the Swedish security policy and the cut downs of the armed forces, a 
relatively large share of the cohort was assigned a service category but was never conscripted, 
i.e. these individuals did not start the military training. In Table 1, the number of men in the 
cohort (with two Swedish-born parents) is first presented. From this group, individuals were 
called for enlistment test. As can be seen from the table, approximately five percent of the 
cohort were not tested, mainly due to medical reasons. Of the individuals that were tested, 
approximately 80 percent was assigned a service category. Out of the approximately 35,000 
men that were assigned a service category, only about 24,000 were conscripted. This means 
that we have a control group of approximately 11,000 men. 
 
Table 1. The cohort of Swedish born having two Swedish-born  
parents divided and its selection into military service.  
Group  Number of individuals 
Cohort  46,305 
Called for enlistment test  43,939 
Tested  43,340 
Assigned a service category  35,414 
Conscripted  23,886 
Note: The cohort refers to the number of individuals with  
Swedish-born parents. 
                                                 
6 The category private is in this paper also used for the air force (air man) and the navy (sea man). 7 
 
 
For our purposes it is important to compare the characteristics of the conscripted group with 
the control group (assigned a service but not conscripted). The groups are compared with 
respect to the psychological ability and cognitive ability that are evaluated at the enlistment 
test; these indicators are important determinants for the assignment of service category.
7 For 
the  squad  leader  and  platoon  leader  categories  we  have  also  compared  the  evaluation  of 
leadership ability. The leadership ability is evaluated if the individual scoring five or higher 
on the cognitive test. We have not presented the mean values of the leadership ability for the 
private category since a large share of the group has not been evaluated. 
Since the cohort was conscripted during a time of extensive reformation of the 
armed forces, we argue that it is reasonable to consider the control group as randomized. If 
the  consequences  of  the  military  cut-downs  and  closedowns  of  regiments  were  fully 
anticipated,  we  would  expect  the  armed  forces  to  have  taken  advantage  of  the  option  to 
choose  the  most  suitable  men  for  the  military  services.
8  In  this  case  we  should  observe 
substantial differences between the groups.
9 As was mentioned earlier, a possible source of 
selection may be found in the process of regiment closedowns. Less advanced units may have 
                                                 
7 We have also access to the grade point average (GPA) from the 9
th year of compulsory school. However, we do 
not consider the GPA in the analysis since it is highly correlated with the cognitive test score. If GPA is used in 
the empirical analysis instead of the cognitive test score, the main results are not altered. 
8 Although we have access to a wide range of individual characteristics, we cannot rule out that the military 
defence  has  access  to  information  (individual  characteristics)  that  is  not  available  to  us.  Such  unobserved 
characteristics (for the researcher) may origin from the individuals’ preferences for military services. However, 
we cannot find any reasonable argument that strong preferences for the armed forces should be correlated with 
higher productivity in the civil life. For the platoon leader category, where the individual’s assent is required, it 
is not reasonable to argue that the conscript group is more motivated than the control group. Preferences for the 
military defence may also affect some of the control variables. A person with an aversion to military training 
might try to underachieve during the tests. In this case, the true ability of the control group is actually higher and 
earnings effect of completing military training will be underestimated. 
9 For later cohorts, the group of conscripts is certainly not randomised since the military defence has adapted to 
the new security policy environment. One example of the adaptive process is the so-called education reserve that 
was implemented after the 1992 defence resolution. One implication of the reserve was that individuals were 
tested and afterwards placed in the reserve without an assignment of a service category. These individuals were 
seen as a possible source of future conscripts if new security policy threats would emerge. However, 98 percent 
of the 1973 cohort was tested prior to the implementation of the education reserve so the risk of selection bias 
stemming from this source seems remote. 
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required conscripts with lower “skill profile”, these units were more likely to face cut-downs. 
However, since we have the same information as the National Service Administration, relying 
on selection on observables should be enough. 
Before examining the characteristics of the conscripts and the control group, an 
interesting question is how the characteristics of these two groups compares to the share of 
the cohort that have been tested but have not been assigned a service category. As can be seen 
from  Table  1  this  group  consists  of  7,926  individuals.  Table  2  presents  mean  values  of 
psychological ability and the cognitive test. It is clear that the individuals that have not been 
assigned  a  service  category  have  on  average  lower  values  for  both  measures.  The  most 
noticeable difference is with respect to the psychological ability.  
 
Table 2. Mean values for tested and service category assigned (conscripted and  
non-conscripted) and tested and no service category. 




No service category 
Psychological ability  5.59  5.44  3.61 
Cognitive test  5.35  5.24  4.32 
 
 
In Tables 3 through 8 descriptive statistics are presented for the private category, the squad 
leader category, and the platoon leader category. In Tables 3 and 4 descriptive statistics for 
the individuals with a private category assignment are presented; Table 3 contains the group 
that  have  not  been  conscripted  and  Table  4  the  group  that  have  been  conscripted  and 
completed their military training.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics, private category, non-conscripted. 
Variable  Mean  Min  Max  Std dev  Observations 
Psychological ability  4.70  1  9  1.34  9,047 
Cognitive test  4.52  1  9  1.71  9,349 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics, private category, conscripted. 
Variable  Mean  Min  Max  Std dev  Observations 
Psychological ability  5.01  1  9  1.36  14,613 
Cognitive test  4.70  1  9  1.74  14,999 9 
 
 
Some  differences  can  be  observed  although  they  are  relatively  small.  The  evaluation  of 
psychological ability and the score from the cognitive enlistment test is somewhat higher in 
the conscripted group. In Tables 5 and 6, descriptive statistics can be found for squad leaders. 
The group of squad leaders who has fulfilled their services is almost three times larger than 
the control group. As can be seen from the table, there are very small differences between the 
two groups. The test of cognitive skills is marginally higher in the control group. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics, squad leader, non-conscripted. 
Variable  Mean  Min  Max  Std dev  Observations 
Psychological ability  6.16  2  9  1.18  1,990 
Cognitive test  6.47  3  9  1.27  1,991 
Leadership  6.08  2  9  1.04  1,986 
 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics, squad leader, conscripted. 
Variable  Mean  Min  Max  Std dev  Observations 
Psychological ability  6.38  3  9  1.11  5,742 
Cognitive test  6.30  2  9  1.24  5,744 
Leadership  6.18  3  9  1.00  5,728 
 
 
Turning to the platoon leader category (Tables 7 and 8) there are very small differences in 
characteristics  between  the  groups.  It  is  important  to  note  that  an  individual  cannot  be 
conscripted as a platoon leader on a compulsory basis.  The individual’s assent is required for 
this service category. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics, platoon leader, non-conscripted. 
Variable  Mean  Min  Max  Std dev  Observations 
Psychological ability  7.29  4  9  0.97  980 
Cognitive test  7.33  5  9  1.12  980 






Table 8. Descriptive statistics, platoon leader, conscripted. 
Variable  Mean  Min  Max  Std dev  Observations 
Psychological ability  7.33  4  9  0.92  2,271 
Cognitive test  7.18  5  9  1.14  2,271 
Leadership ability  7.25  4  9  0.83  2,271 
 
To sum up this short review of the descriptive statistics there are no large differences between 
the groups and the strategy to rely on selection on observables seems plausible. Finally, a 
comparison that we have so far not mentioned is the difference in the outcome variable of the 
analysis. A first comparison that might be interesting is to look at the earnings for the share of 
the cohort that was assigned a service and the group that was called for the enlistment test but 
was not assigned a service category for different reasons. The average earnings in 2003 (at the 
age of 30) for the former group are SEK 249,455 and SEK 204,831 for the latter group. The 
average earnings in 2003 for the conscripted group as a whole are SEK 254,396, which can be 
compared with SEK 240,124 for the enrolled but non-conscripted group. It is evident that the 
armed forces are able to select individuals for military training that are also productive in the 
civil  life.  It  is  also  clear  that  the  group  that  has  completed  military  training  has  higher 
earnings on average compared to the non-conscripted group. 
 
4. Empirical model 
 
Regression approach 
The natural logarithm of earnings at the age of 30 is regressed on parental characteristics, 
schooling characteristics, ability characteristics measured during the enlistment test, variables 
describing  the  military  training  and  other  controls.  The  earning  equation  is  estimated 
separately for the three samples, each sample representing a level of command (private, squad 




lnyi = i +  Pi +  Si +  Ai +  Mi + Zi + i 
 
where lnyi is the natural logarithm of earnings in 2003 for individual i, αi is a constant. Pi is a 
vector  of  parental  characteristics  and  Si  is  a  vector  of  schooling  variables.  Individual 
characteristics measuring ability from the enlistment test are included in Ai. The vector Mi 11 
 
contains variables describing the military training that individual i have participated in and the 
grades from military training. The vector Zi contains a number of other control variables. 
  
 , , , ,and  are vectors of parameters to be estimated and εi is an error term. 
  Variable  definitions  are  presented  in  Table  9  and  descriptive  statistics  are 
presented in Table A1 in the appendix. The dependent variable consists of labor income in 
2003, i.e. when the individual is 30 years old. Individuals with annual earnings less than 
40,000  SEK  (approximately  4,300  EURO)  are  excluded.
10  Individuals  that  obtained  their 
highest education level in 2003 as well as individuals receiving study aid in 2003 are also 
excluded. Parental characteristics include the highest education of the father or mother and an 
average earnings variable measured as the mean earnings for the mother and father for the 
years where data is available (1990-1992).
11 
  A dummy variable is included to control for the highest level of education that is 
obtained  by  the  individual.  Low  education  is  defined  as  no  more  than  upper  secondary 
education  and  high  education  is  defined  as  post  upper  secondary  education.  Experience 
measured as the number of years since the highest degree is also included as an explanatory 
variable. The squared experience is also included.  Three additional controls are also included; 
marriage, local unemployment in 2003, and a set of dummy variables capturing the region of 
residence at the time of the enlistment test. 
  Three  variables  from  the  military  enlistment  test  have  been  included  in  the 
regressions. The first is the test of the cognitive ability and the second is the evaluation of 
psychological ability. The final military enlistment test variable is the leadership ability that is 
only evaluated if the individual’s score on the cognitive test is five or higher. The leadership 
ability is only available for the squad leader and platoon leader categories (and a small share 
of  the  private  category).  As  a  consequence  the  leadership  variable  is  not  included  in  the 
analysis of the private category. 
We  have  previously  discussed  our  research  strategy  for  identification  of  the 
wage premium of military training. Military training is identified by a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if the individual has completed military training and zero otherwise. To 
only consider participation might give an unbalanced picture of the training. Military training 
is likely to foster or signal a wide range of personal traits that may be rewarded on the labor 
                                                 
10 See Antelius and Björklund (2000) for a discussion of income restrictions. Alternative cut-off level of SEK 
80,000 and SEK 100,000 have also been tested without altering the main results. 
11 The educational level and incomes of the adults living in the same household as the child during the years 
1990-92 are available. Thus, an adult defined as a parent is not necessarily the child’s biological parent. 12 
 
market, e.g. leadership ability, team working, and endurance. However, some of the military 
training requires personal traits that may not be productivity enhancing for all workers. An 
employer searching for low skilled labor may not see strong leadership ability as a favorable 
trait;  a  tendency  to  follow  all  instructions  without  questioning  might  be  rewarded  in  the 
military services for private categories but may not be seen as a good personal characteristic 
by some employers looking for creative and self-driven workers. In the empirical analysis we 
add an interaction variable between military training and education level in order to control 
for different effects of military training. In addition we have also access to the grades given 
after completed training; i.e. a measure of how well the individual has performed during 
training. Three grades are given and consider, manners, qualification for the position, and 
knowledge  and  skills.  An  interaction  variable  is  constructed  that  combines  the  dummy 




Both  the  regression  technique  and  the  matching  approach  rely  on  the  conditional  mean 
independence  assumption.  However,  while  regression  analysis  also  rest  on  an  additional 
assumption  that  conditioning  linearly  will  remove  the  selection  bias,  matching  solves  the 
selection  problem  by  either  non-parametric  or  semi-parametric  methods.  An  additional 
difference between the two methods is that when obtaining the regression estimates, no care is 
taken to ensure that comparable observations exist.    
A probit model is estimated as a first step in the matching procedure. Based on 
the probit model, matching is carried out on the resulting propensity score. The probit model 
is fitted by including the following variables; a constant, a set of dummy variables capturing 
the  region  of  residence  when  undergoing  the  military  enlistment  test,  parental  income, 
parental  education,  test  score  on  the  psychological  ability  evaluation,  test  score  on  the 
cognitive ability evaluation, and  score on the leadership ability test (not included for the 
private category). Two different matching methods are used; nearest neighbor matching and 
kernel matching using kernel type Epanechnikov. Nearest neighbor matching is carried out 
with  replacement  using  one  respectively  four  neighbors.  The  Epanechnikov  approach  is 
implemented using a bandwidth of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10, respectively. The effect in focus in 
both the kernel and nearest neighbor strategy is the average treatment effect on the treated. 
                                                 
12 For a detailed description of matching, see e.g. Heckman et al. (1998), Imbens (2004) and Smith and Todd 
(2005).  13 
 
 
Table 9: Variable definitions of dependent and independent variables used in the ordinary least squares 
regression, descriptive statistics are presented in the appendix. 
Variable  Definition 
lnyi  Natural logarithm of annual earning for individual i in 2003. 
FamInci  Parental income measured as the average earning of the mother and father for the years 1990-
1992. 
FamEdui  The highest education level obtained by the mother or the father (compulsory school, vocational 
training, three years of upper secondary school, less than two years of post secondary schooling, 
three years or more of post secondary schooling). 
Marriedi  Indicates that the individual is married in 2003.  
Unempl  Unemployment rate in the municipality where the individual is residing in 2003. 
County  Dummy variable indicating the county where the individual is residing the year the enlistment 
test is conducted. 
LowEdui  The variable indicates that three years of upper secondary school is the highest education level. 
HighEdui  The variable indicates that university education is the highest education level. 
Experiencei  The number of years since the highest education was obtained. 
Experience^2i  The squared number of years since the highest education was obtained. 
Cogni  A variable ranking the individuals score on the cognitive test in the military enlistment test. The 
measure range from 1-9 and 5 is the average value for the population. 1 is low ability and 9 is 
high ability. 
PsAbilityi  A measure of psychological ability that is evaluated at the enlistment test by psychologists. The 
measure range from 1-9 and 5 is the average value for the population. 1 is low ability and 9 is 
high ability. 
Leaderi  A measure of leadership ability that is evaluated at the enlistment test by psychologists. The 
measure range from 1-9 and 5 is the average value for the population. The evaluation is only 
conducted if the individual receives a score above average on the cognitive test. 1 is low ability 
and 9 is high ability. 
Mili  A variable taking the value one if the individual have done military services, zero otherwise. 
Mil_Gri  An interaction variable between Mil and the average grade received after military service. The 
average  grade  comprises  three  assessments:  manners,  qualification  for  the  position,  and 
knowledge and skills. The assessment should not be compared for different positions or level of 
commands, i.e. a grade 10-7-7 which is generally seen as a good grade, is not comparable 
between  a  private  category  and  squad  leader.  As  a  point  if  reference,  the  grade  10-7-7  is 
required for service in international missions or admission to military academy. 
Mil_LowEdui  An interaction variable between completed military training and low education level 
Mil_HighEdui  An interaction variable between completed military training and high education level. 
Note: The assessment of manners is generally expected to be graded ten. A grade lower than ten is observed in 
less than one percent for the present cohort, which might be seen as a negative signal on the labor market. In the 
empirical analysis we have also estimated models where a dummy variable is added for the cases where the 




The ordinary least square estimates for all three categories are presented separately in Tables 
10-12. Four different specifications are presented for each category. The first column displays 
results when all individuals in the category are included and no interaction term between 
completed training and educational level is used. In the second column, the interaction term 
between completed training and educational level is added; once again all individuals in the 
category are included. Columns three and four display the results when separate regressions 
are estimated on groups with different educational levels. Naturally, no interactions between 
completed training and educational level are added in these specifications. 
The  effects  of  parental  variables  are  somewhat  ambiguous.  Firstly,  average 
income for the mother and father seems to have a positive effect on earnings. Educational 
level  among  parents  has  a  negative  effect  on  earnings  for  the  private  and  squad  leader 
category,  whereas  no  significant  effects  are  found  in  the  platoon  leader  category.  One 
explanation  to  this  general  pattern  in  the  parental  variables  is  that  education  levels  and 
earnings  among  parents  are  relatively  strong  correlated.  When  earnings  are  excluded  the 
parameter for parental education is positive and significant, the main results are not sensitive 
to this alteration.  
A robust result is that the score on the cognitive test has a positive effect on 
earnings.  This  result  holds  for  all  specifications,  except  for  the  small  group  having  low 
educational level in the platoon leader category. The parameter for the psychological ability is 
significant and positive for the private category. For the squad leader category and platoon 
leader category we have also added the evaluation of leadership ability. The leadership ability 
and psychological ability are highly correlated and the leadership ability seems to large extent 
override the effect of psychological ability; for squad leaders, leadership ability has a positive 
and significant effect in all four regressions while three out of the four regressions in the 
platoon leader category show positive and significant effects. Significant and positive effects 
of psychological ability are still found in three out of four of the regressions for the squad 
leader category. All of the parameter estimates on psychological ability are insignificant in the 
platoon leader category.  
The parameters for the dummy variable indicating educational level show the 
expected pattern, i.e. that individuals with higher educational level have higher earnings. The 
effect is significant in the private and squad leader categories but insignificant in the platoon 15 
 
leader  category.  The  estimated  parameter  of  the  experience  variable  is  positive  and  the 




Table 10: OLS results for the private category. 
 
Variable  All  All  Low Educ  High Educ 
Constant  7.307***  7.303***  7.202***  7.323*** 
FamInc  0.00004***  0.00004***  0.00005***  0.00002*** 
FamEdu  -0.012***  -0.012***  -0.014***  -0.010** 




0.028***  0.029***  0.024***  0.040*** 
HighEduc  0.156***  0.182***     
Experience  0.059***  0.058***  0.069***  0.120*** 
Experience^2  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.009*** 
Mil  0.023***  0.035***  0.037***  -0.005 
Mil_HighEduc    -0.041***     
Adj R
2  0.079  0.080  0.051  0.085 
F  44.91    43.82  21.70  14.09 
Obs  18,738  18,738  13,382  5,356 
Note: *** one percent significance level, ** five percent significance level. Robust standard 
errors used to obtain t-values. Additional controls not displayed in the table are; a dummy 
variable capturing civil status (married/cohabiting or not), local unemployment in region of 
residence 2003, and a set of dummy variables capturing region of residence when undergoing 
the military enlistment test.  
 
Turning to the results for the private category in Table 10, the dummy variable 
for  military  training  has  a  positive  and  significant  effect  in  column  one.  Thus,  when  all 
individuals in the category are included, regardless of educational level, an earnings effect of 
military training of approximately 2.3 percent is indicated.
14 Adding the interaction between 
high  educational  level  and  completed  military  training,  see  column  two,  reveals  that  the 
positive  effect  stems  from  the  low  educational  group.  The  effect  of  completing  military 
training  is  3.5  percent  for  the  low  educational  group  but  4.1  percent  lower  for  the  high 
                                                 
13 In Tables A2-A4 in the appendix  the sensitivity of  the results  to  the  conditioning on  covariates  that  are 
determined  after  the  military  training  is  undertaken,  i.e.  experience,  experience  squared,  educational  level, 
marriage and local unemployment are excluded. This is particularly interesting for the low educational group. 
One  reason  for  studying  might  be  a  weak  labor  market  position.  Thus,  one  might  suspect  that  individuals 
obtaining their highest educational level (still defined as low) later to be negatively selected. Most of the main 
results are not altered.  
14 The calculation exp(coefficient)-1 transforms the coefficient to the exact percentage return. 16 
 
educational group. Both parameters are significant at the one percent level. Running separate 
regressions on each of the educational groups strengthens the conclusion that the earnings 
effect differ between the educational groups; column three indicates an earnings premium of 
3.7 percent for individuals with low education and an insignificant loss of 0.5 percent for the 
high educational group.  
 
Table 11: OLS results for the squad leader category. 
Variable  All  All  Low Educ  High Educ 
Constant  7.187***  7.176***  6.736***  7.189*** 
FamInc  0.00003***  0.00003***  0.00003***  0.00003*** 
FamEdu  -0.013***  -0.013***  -0.009*  -0.016*** 
Cogn  0.025***  0.025***  0.022**  0.025*** 
PsAbility  0.014*  0.014*  0.008  0.016* 
Leader  0.034***  0.034***  0.034***  0.035*** 
HighEduc  0.130***  0.151***     
Experience  0.092***  0.092***  0.149***  0.138*** 
Experience^2  -0.006***  -0.006***  -0.007***  -0.010*** 
Mil  0.020*  0.038*  0.043**  0.014 
Mil_HighEduc    0.028     
Adj R
2  0.091  0.091  0.050  0.093 
F      18.02      17.52      3.27      10.72 
Obs      6,233      6,233      2,297  3,936 
Note: *** one percent significance level, ** five percent significance level, * ten percent 
significance level. Robust standard errors used to obtain t-values. Additional controls not 
displayed in the table are; a dummy variable capturing civil status (married/cohabiting or 
not), local unemployment in region of residence 2003, and a set of dummy variables 
capturing region of residence when undergoing the military enlistment test.  
 
The squad leaders show a similar pattern as the private category. Column one in 
Table 11 shows that there is a 2.0 percent earnings effect for completing military training. The 
earnings effect is significant at the ten percent level. Column two indicates that the effect is 
larger for the low educational group, 3.8 percent, a parameter estimate significant at the five 
percent level. However, column two also shows that there are no significant difference in the 
earnings effect between the educational groups, although, the sign of the interaction indicates 
lower returns for individuals with more education. When separate regressions are run on each 
of  the  educational  groups,  the  message  concerning  educational  group  differences  in  the 
earnings effect is stronger. Column three indicates that the earnings effect is 4.3 percent for 17 
 
the low educational group (significant at the 5 percent level), whereas no significant effect is 
found for the high educational group. 
 
Table 12: OLS results for the platoon leader category. 
Variable  All  All  Low Educ  High Educ 
Constant  7.239***  7.198***  5.718***  7.312*** 
FamInc  0.00002***  0.00002***  0.00003  0.00002*** 
FamEdu  0.002  0.001  0.004  -0.001 
Cogn  0.019**  0.019***  0.016  0.020** 
PsAbility  0.008  0.007  0.051  -0.002 
Leader  0.042***  0.042***  0.027  0.044*** 
HighEduc  0.057  0.107     
Experience  0.118***  0.117***  0.273***  0.147*** 
Experience^2  -0.009***  -0.009***  -0.013***  -0.012*** 
Mil  0.010  0.068  0.072  -0.005 
Mil_HighEduc    -0.069     
Adj R
2  0.104  0.104  0.128  0.098 
F      8.61      8.31      2.75      6.41 
Obs      2,581      2,581      451  2,130 
Note: *** one percent significance level, ** five percent significance, * ten percent 
significance level. Robust standard errors used to obtain t-values. Additional controls not 
displayed in the table are; a dummy variable capturing civil status (married/cohabiting or 
not), local unemployment in region of residence 2003, and a set of dummy variables 
capturing region of residence when undergoing the military enlistment test.  
 
Turning to the last category, platoon leaders, in Table 12, no significant earnings 
effects of military training are found. If only looking at the magnitude of the parameters the 
pattern is the same as before, i.e. the low educational group benefits from training, while the 
effect for the high educational group is around zero. 
To sum up; the results indicate that there are positive earnings effects of serving 
in the private or squad leader category for individuals that subsequently do not obtain a high 
educational  level.  Thus,  it  seems  as  if  some  desirable  skills  are  learned  in  the  military, 
alternatively  that  having  served  signals  desirable  characteristics,  and  that  these 
skills/characteristics are valued on the labor market.
15   
We have also run regressions when including the grade from military training. 
In Table 13 we display the results for the separate regressions on high and low educational 
                                                 
15 We have also checked the robustness of all the OLS results to the timing of military service, i.e. during what 
year the training was undertaken. Neither the inclusion of a variable measuring the year of serving, nor exclusion 
of individuals that completed the military service later than 1994, changes the main results. 18 
 
groups in the three categories. It is clear that the performance during training matters, the 
estimate of the military grade is positive and significant in all sub groups. For the low (high) 
educational group in the private category, the cut-off point is a mean grade of 6.84 (8.21), e.g. 
the  grade  10-5-5  (10-7-7)  is  an  example  of  the  highest  grade  below  the  cut-off  point. 
Approximately 5 (53) percent of the individuals in the private category have an average grade 
that is below the cut-off point.  
 
For the squad leader category, the cut-off point is 6.85 for the low educational group and 7.69 
for the high educational group. In the low (high) educational group roughly 4 (21) percent of 
the individuals have an average grade that is below the cut-off point. Finally, the cut-off point 
in the platoon leader category is 6.44 (8.49) for the low (high) educational group. The fraction 
of individuals below the cut-off points is around 2 percent for the low educational group and 
49 percent for the high educational group. A point of reference in this discussion is that the 
minimum requirement for recruitment to international peacekeeping missions is 10-7-7. It is 
important to note that the grades are not comparable between the different groups since they 
reflect the skills and abilities for a specific service category. It is not clear how to interpret the 
effect of military grades. One possible interpretation is that the grade reflects the amount of 
human  capital  acquired  during  the  military  service,  i.e.  a  human  capital  interpretation. 
Table 13: OLS results including interaction between military training and educational level. 
  Private  Squad  Platoon 
Variable  LowEduc  HighEduc  Low Educ  High Educ  Low Educ  High Educ 
Constant  7.222***  7.338***  6.790***  7.209***  5.742***  7.321*** 
FamInc  0.00004***  0.00002***  0.00003***  0.00003***  0.00003  0.00002*** 
FamEdu  -0.014***  -0.009**  -0.009  -0.015***  0.004  -0.001 
Cogn  0.017***  0.021***  0.021**  0.025***  0.017  0.018** 
PsAbility  0.023***  0.038***  0.008  0.014  0.056  0.002 
Leader      0.032**  0.034***  0.020  0.043*** 
Experience  0.068***  0.120***  0.143***  0.137***  0.273***  0.148*** 
Experience^2  -0.003***  -0.009***  -0.007***  -0.010***  -0.013***  -0.012*** 
Mil  -0.216***  -0.340***  -0.230**  -0.261***  -0.264  -0.227 
 Mil_Gr  0.032***  0.041***  0.034***  0.034***  0.041**  0.027* 
Adj R
2  0.053  0.088  0.052  0.096  0.133  0.100 
F  21.81  14.21  3.44  10.74  2.91  6.42 
Obs  13,382  5,356  2,297  3,936       451  2,130 
Note: *** one percent significance level, ** five percent significance level, * ten percent significance level. 
Robust standard errors used to obtain t-values. Additional controls not displayed in the table are; a dummy 
variable capturing civil status (married/cohabiting or not), local unemployment in region of residence 2003, and a 
set of dummy variables capturing region of residence when undergoing the military enlistment test. 19 
 
Another, equally plausible, explanation is that individuals reveal their capacities during the 
training (beyond what is captured in the enlistment tests) and that these capacities are valued 
on the labor market. With the data at hand we cannot separate the two effects.   
 
5.1. Regression vs. Matching 
 
As mentioned above, the  selection on observables strategy  can be implemented  either by 
regression  or  matching. In  this  subsection,  the  robustness  of  the  regression  results  to  the 
alternative approach will be studied. Table 14 reports the estimated  earnings effect using 
regression (previously displayed in the first, third and fourth columns in Tables 10-12) and 
various matching procedures. The matching estimates reported are based on nearest neighbor 
matching  with  replacement  (1  respectively  4  neighbors)  and  matching  using  kernel  type 
Epanechnikov (bandwidth 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10). In all of the matching procedures a probit 
model was fitted to obtain the propensity score. Only a handful of the observations are off 
support in any of the sub groups when matching is carried out. The reported effect is the 
average treatment effect on the treated.  
 
Table 14: Comparison of earnings effect obtained using regression and matching. 




Epan (0.05)  Epan (0.1) 
PRIVATE             
All  0.023***  0.022**  0.023**  0.005  0.008  0.010 
Low Educ  0.030***  0.042***  0.041***  0.032**  0.033**  0.033** 
High Educ  -0.005  -0.020  -0.008  -0.021  -0.021  -0.019 
             
SQUAD             
All  0.020*  0.005  0.007  0.003  0.003  0.003 
Low Educ  0.039**  0.040  0.037  0.024  0.029  0.026 
High Educ  0.014  -0.006  -0.006  -0.007  -0.006  -0.006 
PLATOON
             
All  0.010  0.038  0.019  0.001  0.015  0.013 
Low Educ  0.075  0.071  0.068  0.091  0.086  0.092 
High Educ  -0.005  0.013  0.001  0.001  0.003  0.000 
Note: *** one percent significance level, ** five percent significance level, * ten percent significance 
level. Robust standard errors are used to obtain the t-values in the regression. Additional controls used in 
the regression not displayed in the table are; a dummy variable capturing civil status (married/cohabiting 
or not), local unemployment in region of residence 2003, and a set of dummy variables capturing region 




According to Table 14, the results showing an earnings effect for individuals 
with  low  educational  level  serving  in  the  private  category  remains.  The  positive  and 
significant  effect  when  all  individuals  in  the  private  category  are  included,  regardless  of 
educational level, is prevalent when implementing a nearest neighbor strategy but not when 
the  kernel  approach  is  used.  The  most  apparent  difference  between  the  regression  and 
matching  strategy  in  the  private  category  is  the  estimated  earnings  effect  for  the  high 
educational group; the estimate obtained in the regression is higher than all the matching 
estimates. In Table A2 in the appendix we can see that regressions using only the variables 
included in the matching approach show the same tendency as the matching estimates. The 
variables  that  seem  to  drive  this  are  experience  and  experience  squared.  When  using  a 
regression approach and including only variables used in the matching, the positive earnings 
effect when all individuals are included regardless of educational level disappear. However, 
the positive and significant effect remains for the low educational group. 
Turning to the results for the squad leader category, we see that no significant 
earnings effects are found in any of the groups (All, LowEduc or HighEduc). Again the most 
important difference, apart from the significance levels, is the high educational group. Just as 
for the private category, the estimate obtained for this group using regression is higher than all 
of the matching estimates. Reported in Table A3 in the appendix are results from regressions 
using  only  the  variables  included  in  the  matching  approach.  Again,  it  is  clear  that  the 
estimates for the high educational group is lower (and similar in magnitude to the matching 
estimates) if the full specification is used instead of leaving out covariates not included in the 
matching. For the low educational group the estimates using nearest neighbor matching is 
similar in magnitude (however insignificant) to the once obtained from regression, while the 
kernel approach result in somewhat smaller estimates.  
Finally, no significant results are found for the platoon leader category using the 
matching strategy, results displayed in Table 14. If looking at the magnitudes of the estimates, 
the  pattern  from  the  regression  analysis  is  repeated.  Results  when  not  including  other 
variables than used in the matching procedure are displayed in Table A4 in the appendix. 
To summarise, the conclusion that there is an earnings effect for individuals 
serving  in  the  private  category  and  subsequently  not  obtain  a  high  educational  level  is 
strengthened by the results obtained using matching. No other significant earnings effects are 





The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of military training on annual earnings for 
men at the age of 30. The analysis is based on the cohort of men born in 1973 and residing in 
Sweden on December 31, 1990. In order to avoid discrimination issues we only consider men 
with Swedish born parents.  
  The  1973  cohort  was  enlisted  during  a  period  when  the  armed  forces 
experienced considerable cut-downs. As a consequence a relatively large share of the cohort 
was assigned a service category but was not conscripted. We argue that the change in the 
Swedish security policy offers an exogenous shift that can be used for identification of the 
training effect. Moreover, given that we have access to test results from the enlistment test as 
well as other important background variables we feel confident that relying on a selection on 
observables strategy is reasonable. Regression is our main approach but we also check the 
sensitivity of our results by implementing a matching strategy.  
The  empirical  analysis  is  based  on  three  sub-samples,  representing  different 
levels of command and different length of the training period (private, squad leader, platoon 
leader).  Separate  analyses  are  also  carried  out  on  groups  of  individuals  with  different 
educational levels. The regression results indicate that military training has a positive effect 
on  earnings  at  the  age  of  30  for  individuals  serving  in  the  private  category  and  not 
subsequently  obtaining  higher  education.  This  result  is  repeated  when  implementing  a 
matching  strategy.  There  may  be  several  explanations  to  this  result.  One  is  that  military 
training enhances skills and abilities that are rewarded only for some positions on the labor 
market, e.g. the tendency to follow instructions and orders may be highly rewarded in some 
sectors. Another explanation is that military training can be seen as a marginal post-secondary 
education, and the effect of this training is overridden by university education. When relying 
on regression analysis, a positive and significant effect on the group serving as squad leaders 
is also found. However, the significance of this result disappears when the matching strategy 
is applied. No significant earnings effects are found for the platoon leader category. In none 
of  the  three  categories  significant  effects  are  found  for  the  group  of  individuals  that 
subsequently obtain a high educational level. The main results stemming from the regression 
approach are not altered if only including variables that are determined before undertaking the 
military training (i.e. if measures of experience, civil status and regional unemployment are 
excluded). The average grade received after completed training is positively associated with 
earnings. This result holds for all levels of command and all educational groups.   22 
 
Several  questions  are  interesting  for  future  research.  The  present  analysis 
indicates that military training may have an effect on annual earnings for low educational 
groups. Since the military training is generally completed before the labor market entry, a 
follow up issue is to what extent drafted individuals are more likely to be employed than non-
drafted. Another research question is whether military training is important for individuals 
with foreign background. Finally, it is important to note that the armed forces today still rely 
on the conscription system although a standing army is not as remote as it was during the cold 
war era. The share of the cohort that is drafted today is very small and international peace 
keeping missions after completed training are relatively common. An interesting question is 
how military training and experience from international missions are rewarded on the labor 





























Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std dev  Min  Max 
yi  2,783  1,151  401  45,126 
FamInci  2,426  1,232  0  23,976 
FamEdui  2.46  1.69  0  5 
Cogni  5.31  1.84  1  9 
PsAbilityi  5.47  1.51  1  9 
Leaderi  5.57  1.43  1  9 
Mili  0.66  0.47  0  1 
HighEduci  0.41  0.49  0  1 
Experiencei  8.67  3.84  1  15 
Marriedi  0.21  0.40  0  1 
Unempli  4.39  1.33  1.7  11.8 
         
N.obs.  27,552       




Table A2: OLS results for private category when only including 
matching variables.  
Variable  All  Low Educ  High Educ 
Constant  7.428***  7.471***  7.501*** 
FamInc  0.00004***  0.00005***  0.00003*** 
FamEdu  -0.009***  -0.013***  -0.010** 
PG  0.030***  0.017***  0.030*** 
PsAbility  0.033***  0.028***  0.043*** 
Mil  0.021***  0.038***  -0.019 
Adj R
2  0.055  0.052  0.038 
F  34.27  24.51  6.97 
Obs  18,738  13,382  5,356 
Note: *** one percent significance level, ** five percent significance 
level, * ten percent significance level. Robust standard errors are used to 




Table A3: OLS results for squad leader category when only 
including matching variables.  
Variable  All  Low Educ  High Educ 
Constant  7.324***  7.441***  7.474*** 
FamInc  0.00004***  0.00003***  0.00003*** 
FamEdu  -0.007*  -0.007***  -0.013** 
PG  0.041***  0.022**  0.029*** 
PsAbility  0.011  0.006  0.014*** 
Leadership  0.042***  0.037**  0.038*** 
Mil  0.011  0.045**  -0.003 
Adj R
2  0.049  0.041  0.040 
F  10.70  2.84  5.49 
Obs  6,233  2,297  3,936 
Note: *** one percent significance level, ** five percent 
significance level, * ten percent significance level. Robust 





Table A4: OLS results for platoon leader category when 
only including matching variables.  
Variable  All  Low Educ  High Educ 
Constant  7.377***  7.039***  7.565*** 
FamInc  0.00003***  0.00003  0.00002*** 
FamEdu  0.008  0.008***  0.002** 
PG  0.030***  0.012  0.020** 
PsAbility  0.007  0.056  -0.001 
Leadership  0.043***  0.033  0.044*** 
Mil  0.007  0.087  -0.010 
Adj R
2  0.050  0.104  0.042 
F  4.66  2.15  3.87 
Obs  2,581       451  2,130 
Note: *** one percent significance level, ** five percent 
significance level, * ten percent significance level. Robust 
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